















The Thesis Committee for Maliki Eyvonne Ghossainy 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 































Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 










First, I would like to express my gratitude towards my mentor, Jacqueline 
Woolley, for her guidance and continuous support throughout every stage of this project. 
Thank you for always finding time to meet with me and advise me through the various 
stages of this project. I would also like to thank my committee members, Rebecca Bigler 
and Cristine Legare, for their dedication and insight.  
The completion of this project was made possible, in part, by the exceptional staff 
and teachers at the Montessori Center, the Children’s Discovery Center, the Priscilla 
Pond Flawn Child and Family Laboratory, and Extend-A-Care Kids afterschool centers, 
all of whom showed kindness and cooperation with the various demands of the study and 
by the parents who believed in the importance of developmental research. This study is 
unquestionably indebted to all the children who participated in the study; thank you for 
making work so much fun. I am also very grateful for receiving the Debra Beth Lobliner 
Summer Salary Award that helped support the financial costs of this research.  
I would especially like to thank my best friend and life partner, Rami Elali, for 
always believing in me, and Chelsea Cornelius for teaching me strength. I love you both 
very much. I am grateful for Sarah Satinsky, Bryn Schiele, Madeleine Nguyen-Cao, 
Justin Cole, and Lauren Acosta for their time and efforts in data collection, as well as the 
remaining members of the Imagination and Cognition lab for their support throughout 











Maliki Eyvonne Ghossainy, M. A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011 
 
Supervisor:  Jacqueline D. Woolley 
 
The first goal of this study is to test the prediction that children who perceive 
similarity between a novel physical event and the real world will be more likely to 
express belief in the reality of a novel character involved in the event than children who 
do not perceive such similarity. The second goal is to test the effects of familiarity on 
similarity judgements, reality status beliefs, and their association. In this study, children 
ages 4 and 6 years were visited 5 times and were repeatedly told about a novel character 
performing either a highly similar, moderately dissimilar, or a highly dissimilar physical 
event. Their similarity judgements and reality status judgements were solicited on days 1 
and 5. Results revealed high rates of association between similarity and reality status 
beliefs for the highly similar and moderately dissimilar events but low levels of 
association for the highly dissimilar event on day 1. With repeated exposure, children’s 
positive similarity judgements increased for the highly dissimilar event leading to higher 
rates of association.  
 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................ vii	  
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... viii	  
The Relations Among Perceived Similarity, Familiarity, and Beliefs About Reality
 ........................................................................................................................ 1	  
Defining a Fictional World ............................................................................ 4	  
Changes in Belief Over Time ........................................................................ 9	  
Method .................................................................................................................. 12	  
Participants ................................................................................................... 12	  
Materials ...................................................................................................... 12	  
Procedure ..................................................................................................... 13	  
Dependent Measures .................................................................................... 13	  
Similarity Judgements ......................................................................... 13	  
Reality Judgements ............................................................................. 14	  
Association Between Similarity and Reality Judgements .................. 14	  
Results ................................................................................................................... 15	  
Overview ...................................................................................................... 15	  
Scoring ......................................................................................................... 16	  
Similarity Judgements .................................................................................. 16	  
Reality Judgements ...................................................................................... 17	  
Associations between Similarity and Reality Judgements ........................... 17	  
Initial Exposure ................................................................................... 17	  
Repeated Exposure .............................................................................. 19	  
Discussion ............................................................................................................. 20	  
Appendix A: Response Form ................................................................................ 28	  
References ............................................................................................................. 32	  
 vii 
List of Tables 
Table 1:	   Frequency of positive similarity judgements and REAL judgements on day 
1. ....................................................................................................... 25	  
 viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1:	   Frequency of each response pattern across conditions at day 1. ........ 26	  




The Relations Among Perceived Similarity, Familiarity, and Beliefs 
About Reality 
 
As humans, we possess the ability to create and perpetuate narratives for our own 
pleasure and for the purpose of sharing them with others. Narratives can either tell us 
some truth about our world or can tell a captivating story without holding any 
fundamental truth relation to our world. The ancient Greeks told stories about mythical 
creatures whom they believed were responsible for maintaining world order. The age of 
enlightenment brought about literary works advocating the use of reason as the source of 
true knowledge and morality. Conversely, Douglas Adams’ The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
the Galaxy is a window into a novel fictional world. With such an expansive source of 
narratives, how do we decide which to take as truth and which to enjoy as a work of 
fiction, and how does this ability develop?  
One view of development holds that children are unequipped to differentiate 
reality and non-reality. Perhaps adults but not children possess a sharp division between 
what is real and what is not real (Skolnick and Bloom, 2006). In line with this view, 
researchers have documented children’s belief in fantastical entities like monsters and 
dragons (Sharon and Woolley, 2004) as well as in culturally endorsed entities like the 
Easter Bunny and Santa Claus (Clark, 1995; Sharon and Woolley, 2004). In one study, 
Sharon and Woolley (2004) asked children between the ages of 3- and 5-years to identify 
the reality status of a number of different characters, some real and some fictional. Their 
results indicated that, with age, children get increasingly better at correctly identifying 
real characters, while appreciation for the fictional nature of non-real characters comes 
later in development. Thus, although children become increasingly aware that certain 
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beings are real, they remain inclined to believe that many fictional beings are real, 
especially those fostered by their parents and social surroundings.  
More recently, however, researchers have documented many nuances in 
children’s beliefs about reality. Although there are some instances in which children 
seem to readily accept novel information, there is also much evidence that reveals their 
strong analytical nature. In one study, Chandler and Lalonde (1994) demonstrated that 
children have theories and expectations about how the world works, such that when they 
are presented with a seemingly impossible event, they actively explore their environment 
for cues to identify the mechanism responsible for the event. In their study, children 
between the ages of 3-and 4-years were shown the traditional Baillargeon box (e.g., 
Baillargeon, 1987) which appears to defy a fundamental law of physics. Surprised at the 
outcome, these children explored the apparatus until they identified the trap door 
responsible for the illusion. Further evidence of children’s incredulity comes from a study 
by Woolley and Cox (2007) exploring children’s understanding of storybook reality. In 
their study, the researchers read a number of stories to children between the ages of 3- 
and 5-years, and asked them a series of questions regarding the possibility of the story’s 
events and the nature of the characters. The researchers found that even the youngest of 
their participants differentially judged the possibility of the events according to the type 
of story they heard. Specifically, children who heard fantastical stories judged that the 
events could not occur in reality, whereas children who heard realistic stories were more 
likely to claim that the events could occur in real life. Such work has challenged the 
traditional view of children as faith-filled, fantasy-prone beings and credited these 
youngsters with a richer, more adult-like construal of reality. 
A similar inconsistency exists in the literature on adults’ conception of reality. 
While some researchers have demonstrated that adults discriminate between improbable, 
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yet possible, events and impossible, law defying events (Shtulman, 2007), recent reports 
have documented that adults also endorse and express belief in supernatural forces 
(Subbotsky, 2004). For example, a recent Gallup poll (2007) surveyed over 1000 adults 
regarding their belief in God, the Devil, and other supernatural entities. Results from their 
nationwide survey reported that 86% of American adults believe in God, 69% confess to 
believing in the Devil, and 75% claim they believe in angels. Pepitone and Saffioti (1997) 
have found that adults endorse supernatural forces and entities, including luck, fate, and 
God, to explain some of life’s unexpected and puzzling events. Furthermore, Gray and 
Wegner (2010) have demonstrated that adults blame God for people’s suffering, 
particularly when no other agent is available to take the blame. Belief in such 
supernatural entities raises questions of whether adults do indeed have a strict distinction 
between reality and non-reality.  
 In light of this variation in belief, to say that adults, but not children, have a 
“sharp division between what is real and what is not” (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006a, p. 73) 
seems misleading. Not only does it seem incorrect to assert that children lack this 
division, it also seems misleading to declare that adults possess it. In an empirical study, 
Skolnick and Bloom (2006b) investigated children and adults’ understanding of fiction, 
specifically fictional narratives. They tested the hypothesis that children, unlike adults, 
create one fictional world which encompasses all fictional stories they have encountered, 
and distinguish it from one real world which encompasses all their real world knowledge. 
To test this hypothesis, the researchers asked the participants to judge the nature of 
various relationships shared between 1) themselves and a real person (e.g., their mother), 
2) themselves and a fictional character 3) two fictional characters from different worlds 
(e.g., SpongeBob and Batman) and 4) between fictional characters of the same world 
(e.g., Batman and Robin). Their predictions explained that if children create one all 
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encompassing fictional world, then they would state that all fictional characters are real to 
each other. For example, children would state that SpongeBob and Batman are real to one 
another, therefore implying that these two characters are part of the same world. 
Their results revealed not only that children separate real worlds from fictional 
worlds but also that children, like adults, distinguish fictional worlds from each other. 
They found that both children and adults separate the world of Batman from that of 
SpongeBob insofar as they agree that Batman is fictional to SpongeBob but not to Robin. 
Thus, it appears that children and adults construct fictional worlds similarly, insofar as 
they both separate characters into different fictional worlds, rather than creating one 
dichotomy of real versus fiction. 
  
DEFINING A FICTIONAL WORLD   
According to Skolnick and Bloom (2006a), fictional worlds are judged as such in 
virtue of their dissimilarity to our world. In the present paper, I extend this view to 
propose that this to applies not only to fictional worlds, but to all novel worlds we 
encounter. For example, upon first hearing about the world of Harry Potter, we might 
evaluate it as dissimilar to our actual world and conclude that it is fictional. Likewise, 
upon first hearing about the world of the Brazilian Satere-Mawe tribes (where a rite of 
passage to manhood involves enduring ten minutes of direct stings by bullet ants; 
Haddad, Cardosa, and Moraes, 2005), we might evaluate it as dissimilar to our actual 
world and mistakenly conclude that it is fictional. Such realities are what I refer to as 
dissimilar real worlds, and they are presented to us quite frequently, for example in 
historical accounts, in reading about novel inventions, and even as we contemplate the 
future. Arthur C. Clarke’s third law holds that “any sufficiently advanced technology is 
 5 
indistinguishable from magic” (Clarke, 1962). Indeed, the ideas that one could 
communicate with others at anytime without having to see them or be near them, and that 
one could build heavier-than-air flying machines were once deemed impossible. Is it 
possible, then, to correctly categorize all novel worlds upon the first encounter and is this 
a skill that changes with age?  
I argue that we have no a priori way of determining the true reality status of a 
novel world. Rather, we make judgements based on similarity evaluations. I consider 
similarity evaluations to be the underlying mechanism that guides one’s judgements 
about what is factual and what is fictional. To elaborate, I contend that all novel worlds, 
whether real or not, lie on a continuum of degrees of similarity to our own view of the 
real world. There is no objective split demarcating what we consider reality and non-
reality - rather, each individual draws the line in accordance with his/her conception of 
what is similar to the actual world. The obvious question that follows is: What makes a 
world more similar to ours?   
One strategy we can employ in assessing similarity is to evaluate the degree to 
which the novel world adheres to our theories about the laws of nature. Upon 
encountering a novel world, we evaluate the degree of discrepancy between the laws that 
govern our world and those that govern the novel world. Johnson and Harris (1994) 
document the sophisticated knowledge that 3- and 4-year-olds display when 
differentiating an event consistent with our physical laws from an event inconsistent with 
our physical laws. In their study, children were asked to identify which of a pair of events 
could be attributed to an ordinary child and which could be attributed to a magic fairy. By 
age three, children in their study seemed to display a strict distinction between ordinary 
and magical events. Furthermore, researchers have provided strong evidence that children 
appreciate the constraints of physical and biological laws on the events that can occur in 
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our world (e.g., Woolley and Cox, 2007; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling, and Gelman, 
1994). These studies provide support for the claim that expectations about the physical 
world can influence our judgements about reality status, making it a candidate for 
evaluating similarity. To illustrate the point, we can imagine that we have encountered, 
for the first time, a world where robots have consciousness. We might conclude that this 
is a fictional world, if and only if we consider this a violation of the physical laws in our 
world. 
Indeed, research has confirmed that children as young as 4-years of age are able 
to reflect on the possibility of an event to infer the reality status of the event and the 
characters involved in it. In a recent study by Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, and Harris 
(2009), children between the ages of 3- and 7- years were presented with a series of 
characters embedded into their own separate stories. Some characters were meant to be 
factual/historical in the sense that the stories contained no unexpected violations of real-
world physical and causal laws. For example, children heard a story about a girl named 
Anne Paine from Washington D.C. who grew up to become a doctor. Other characters 
were intended to be fictional in that their stories involved events that are stark violations 
of physical laws. For example, children heard a story about a girl named Sarah Adams 
who owned a magic blanket that kept her safe and made her invisible. In these examples, 
correct responses would place Anne Paine into the category of real characters and Sarah 
Adams into the category of fictional characters. The researchers also included familiar 
characters in their experiment, including, but not limited to, a factual/historical story 
about George Washington and a fictional story about Snow White. Their results indicated 
that children of all ages were able to correctly categorize the familiar characters, but only 
the older children - 5- to 7-year-olds - correctly distinguished the novel characters. 
Moreover, children’s explanations indicated that only the older children made inferences 
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based on the (im)possibility of the story’s events. Still, the researchers were interested in 
probing this age difference to identify whether younger children are in principle unable to 
make these inferences. 
To investigate this possibility, Corriveau et al. (2009) presented children between 
the ages of 3- and 5- years with a series of novel characters similar to the ones described 
earlier. The researchers asked the children first to identify whether the events in the 
stories were possible in real life before judging the reality status of the characters. In this 
manipulation, the researchers found that even the youngest children (as young as 3 years) 
were able to correctly associate the possibility of the events with the reality status of the 
character. The researchers interpret these findings to mean that children learn to deploy 
this strategy to judge the nature of the story by the end of the preschool years, but that 
younger children are capable of making use of the strategy when prompted. Insofar as 
children are capable of making possibility judgements of certain events, we can expect 
that they will successfully determine the reality status of novel characters in many 
instances. However, as the researchers point out, this strategy can lead to faulty 
categorizations (such as in cases of realistic fiction).  
The strategy just discussed involves ascertaining the (im)possibility of a story’s 
events to guide one’s judgements about its factuality. However, not all fictional stories 
contain fantastical elements, nor do historical/factual stories always seem entirely 
ordinary. It follows, then, that evaluating the possibility of events is not a fail-proof 
thought process for deciding which stories are meant to report facts about the real world 
and which are meant to provide a fictional narrative.   
A second possible criterion for categorizing worlds as similar or dissimilar relates 
to the degree of compliance with our social norms and expectations of appropriate 
normative behavior. Research suggests that children make judgements about possibility 
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based on how well an event fits into their existing social schemes. In a study by Kalish 
(1998), 3- and 4-year-olds were told stories about children who wanted to perform 
different kinds of actions and were asked to judge whether the actions could or could not 
be executed. Some stories depicted ordinary actions while others violated physical laws 
or social conventions. One story, for example, described a little boy who wanted to play 
in the snow with no clothes on. The results of the study indicated that children in both age 
groups were able to determine that some actions could be performed whereas others 
could not. However, the researchers found that these young children tended to exaggerate 
the constraints on actions that violated social conventions such that these actions, like 
those that violated physical rules, were considered not permissible. Similarly, Shtulman 
and Carey (2007) and Browne and Woolley (2004) have reported that young children 
consider improbable events, which typically violate social convention, as impossible in 
our world, whereas older children and adults do not consider violations of social norms 
an indication that an event is impossible in our world. For example, young children who 
hear about a world where people eat pickle-flavored ice cream might evaluate this as 
dissimilar to their conception of appropriate social behavior, and therefore conclude that 
the world is fictional. Older children might hear about the same event but consider this 
sufficiently similar to the actual world and therefore conclude that this is factual. 
Together, the data and the examples suggest that conformity to our social rules plays an 
important role in guiding our similarity judgements and subsequently our reality status 
beliefs.  
Finally, one might stipulate that the perceptual appearance of a novel world might 
factor into our beliefs about its similarity to our world. On the one hand, cartoons or 
storybooks might set themselves apart from the real world by virtue of their appearances. 
For example, Dexter’s world (of Dexter’s Laboratory) might be quarantined as fictional 
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simply because it looks unlike our world. Alternatively, advances in computer animation 
technology have been credited for their highly realistic depictions of fictional worlds such 
as director Peter Jackson's vision of Middle-Earth from J. R. R. Tolkien's Lord of the 
Rings.  
CHANGES IN BELIEF OVER TIME   
These three factors - physical law, social convention, and perceptual similarity - 
present a coherent and plausible method for evaluating the similarity of a novel world to 
our own. No single factor determines the overall perceived similarity - rather, they are all 
components of the similarity evaluation. This framework explains why people can come 
to different conclusions about the reality status of a novel world, insofar as each 
judgement is consistent with each individual’s own world view. The hypothesis, then, is 
that whether a novel world is categorized as real or fictional is a function of its similarity 
to one’s worldview. In the context of the present study, only similarity of physical events 
(hereby referred to as physical law similarity and to be distinguished from similarity in 
appearance, which is referred to as perceptual similarity) is manipulated but results will 
provide motivation for a second study looking at the effects of social and perceptual 
similarity.  
The view explained so far posits that each individual creates a continuum of 
worlds varying in their degree of similarity to the actual world. Worlds that are 
sufficiently similar to one’s world, based on the factors explained above, are categorized 
as real, and are to be distinguished from worlds which are not similar to our world and 
thus categorized as not real. However, the position of each world on this continuum 
clearly changes over time. We see this, for example, in children’s decreasing belief in 
magic with age (Phelps & Woolley, 1994). Moreover, beliefs can also increase over time. 
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Consider, for example, the centuries that passed before the belief that atoms are the 
smallest unit of all matter became widely accepted. How, though, do our beliefs change 
over time? 
A fourth factor is suggested to explain changes in beliefs about reality status over 
time. It is proposed that familiarity with a novel world increases its perceived similarity 
to our world. Such familiarity is proposed to be a direct result of exposure, such that the 
more we are exposed to a narrative, the more familiar it becomes. This increased 
familiarity subsequently increases our sense of similarity, independently of the three 
factors previously discussed. Previous literature on the effects of familiarity on beliefs 
about attractiveness and perceived similarity provides support for this relationship. In a 
study by Moreland and Zajonc (1982), the researchers explored the relationship between 
repeated exposure and ratings of attractiveness and similarity to oneself. They 
manipulated the number of exposures their participants had to a person’s face and 
recorded 1) participants’ ratings of perceived similarity of the person to oneself and 2) 
ratings of attractiveness. Their results suggested a strong relationship between familiarity 
and similarity, such that repeated exposure predicted increased ratings of similarity to 
oneself as well as increased ratings of attractiveness. Conversely, perceived familiarity 
also increased with a higher degree of similarity. This literature supports the hypothesis 
that there is an intimate relationship between familiarity with novel characters and 
subsequent similarity judgements. 
Further support for this hypothesis can be found in recent research documenting 
the neurological relationship between representations of familiar characters and real 
characters. Abraham and von Cramon (2009) have used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging techniques to illustrate that activation of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex 
and the posterior cingulate cortex (areas responsible for autobiographical memory and 
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self referential processes) is triggered when participants are asked to think about real 
characters but not fictional characters, and also when looking at familiar faces but not 
unfamiliar faces. Such evidence further motivates the prediction that familiarity has some 
effect on our reality status beliefs.  
There are two conceivable changes that might occur with increasing familiarity. 
On the one hand, it is possible that familiarity will bring about corrective changes. For 
example, a previously held false belief about the non-reality of a character may become a 
true belief about the reality of its existence. Alternatively, familiarity can lead to 
erroneous changes, in cases where true beliefs become false beliefs. For example, a 
highly familiar fictional character could come to be judged as real. 
Thus, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, it is to assess the associations 
between perceived similarity and beliefs about reality status. It is predicted that children 
who perceive similarity between a novel physical event and the real world will be more 
likely to express belief in the reality of a novel character involved in the event than 
children who do not perceive similarity between the event and the real world. The second 
goal is to assess the effects of familiarity, via repeated exposure, on similarity 
judgements, reality status beliefs, and their association. It is predicted that repeated 
exposure will increase either beliefs about similarity or reality status in such a way that 
their association is strengthened. There are two possible ways this increase in association 
may occur. First, it may increase due to changes in children's perceptions of similarity. 
That is, events that were originally deemed dissimilar to the real world come to be 
viewed as similar, or vice versa. Second, associations may increase due to changing 
beliefs in the reality of the novel character. Although this study will only focus on 
physical events, predictions similarly apply to social events.  
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Method 
PARTICIPANTS   
Eighty-eight typically developing male and female children between the ages of 
4- and 6- years were included in this study. Children were recruited through local 
preschools and elementary schools and were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: a highly similar condition (N = 30), a moderately dissimilar condition (N = 
30), or a highly dissimilar condition (N = 28). These age groups were selected based on 
previous literature documenting developmental differences in children’s judgements of 
possibility and reality in the context of social and physical violations. Corriveau et al. 
(2009) reported that older children, ages 5- to 7-years, are able to spontaneously reflect 
on the possibility of events in judging the reality status of novel characters. Shtulman and 
Carey (2007) found that children younger that 8 years show naive incredulity towards 
events that seem improbable. As such, these age groups are appropriate for exploring 
developmental differences in children’s initial judgements about similarity and reality 
status and the changes in their association that occur with repeated exposure. 
MATERIALS 
Three novel narratives were constructed such that they each included the same 
physical event, riding a bike. One narrative included an ordinary, highly similar event - 
riding a bike with two wheels.  The second included a possible but moderately dissimilar 
event (i.e., an event that does not violate any physical laws, but is conceptually unlikely) 
- riding a bike with one wheel. The third included a highly dissimilar event (i.e., includes 
a violation of physical laws) - riding a bike with no wheels.  (See appendix for 
narratives). Each narrative was accompanied by a photograph of a boy riding the 
 13 
corresponding bike to ensure that children focused on the target event. The number of 
wheels notwithstanding, the three photos were essentially identical. 
PROCEDURE 
Children were visited at their schools and were interviewed individually in a quiet 
corner of the classroom or adjacent hallway. Participants were assigned to a single 
condition in which they heard one of the three vignettes once a day for five days. 
Children also saw a picture of the target event. After each reading session, children were 
asked a series of 4-5 forced choice questions (see Appendix for script).  
DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Similarity Judgements 
On day 1, children were asked questions about the perceived similarity of the 
event and about the reality status of the character. First, children were asked explicitly to 
judge the similarity between the novel event and the real world. They were asked Q1) 
“Tell me, do people around you do things like ride a bike with ___ wheels in real life ?”. 
Children who responded positively to this question were considered to believe that target 
event is similar to the real world. Children who responded negatively to this question, 
however, were offered a second opportunity to express their perceptions of similarity. 
This was done to avoid the possibility that some children might have difficulty 
abstracting away from the literal interpretation of this first question (Q1), namely whether 
people in their immediate experience ride the specific bike in the picture. Thus, the 
addition of a second, more explicit question about the similarity between the physical law 
in the narrative and reality was included. Specifically, they were asked Q2) “Do you 
think someone could ride a bike with __ wheels in real life?”. If children responded 
positively to this follow up question, they were considered to believe that the novel event 
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is similar to the real world. Children who responded positively to Q1 were not asked Q2 
because any affirmation that people do things like ride the type of bike in question 
assumes or implies that people could ride such bikes. Children who responded negatively 
to both questions were considered as rejecting any similarity between the novel event and 
the real world. 
Reality Judgements 
After answering the similarity questions, children were asked two filler questions 
which were included to avoid association between the test questions and to lengthen the 
interview to a more natural length. The final question assessed children’s beliefs about 
the reality status of the character. Specifically, they were asked Q3) “Is Mark a real boy 
or is he a pretend boy?”  
As mentioned, the reading sessions were continued for 5 days, but only the first 
and final sessions were of interest for this study. The final session on day 5 followed the 
exact procedure as on day 1; all the same questions were asked. This second iteration of 
judgements was meant to evaluate the second hypothesis, that familiarity influences the 
association between similarity judgements and reality status beliefs. On days 2-4, 
children heard the narrative but were then asked a set of 4-5 forced choice filler questions 
simply to minimize variability between each session. None of the questions from days 2-
4 were included in the analyses. 
Association Between Similarity and Reality Judgements 
To test the hypothesized relation between similarity judgements and reality status 
beliefs, each individual child’s response pattern was scored. There were four possible 
response patterns for any single interview (2 levels of similarity x 2 levels of reality 
status beliefs). Associations were counted when children said the novel event was similar 
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to their real world AND that the novel character was real and when children said the 
novel event was dissimilar to the real world AND that the novel character was not real. 
Dissociations were counted whenever a child said that the event was similar to the real 
world but that the character was fictional or when a child said that the event was 
dissimilar but the character was real. Again, these associations and dissociations were 
calculated for both time points to assess the familiarity hypothesis. 
Results 
OVERVIEW 
Presentation of the analyses follows three steps. In the first step, descriptive 
statistics for children’s similarity judgements across the three conditions are presented. 
The purpose of this was to determine whether the rates of positive similarity judgements 
varied in accordance with the intended variation between the three conditions. That is, 
were children’s similarity judgements highest in the highly similar condition, followed by 
those in the moderately dissimilar condition, and lowest in the highly dissimilar 
condition? In the second step, descriptive statistics for children’s reality judgements 
across the three conditions are presented. The purpose of this was to determine whether 
the rate of children’s reality judgements mirrored the rates of similarity judgements 
within each condition. That is, were rates of REAL judgements highest among children in 
the highly similar condition, followed by those in the moderately dissimilar condition, 
and lowest among children in the highly dissimilar condition? In the third step, 
associations between similarity and reality judgements upon initial exposure (day 1) and 
after repeated exposure (day 5) are compared across the three conditions. The purpose of 
this was to assess associations within each individual’s response pattern both upon initial 
exposure and after repeated exposure.  
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SCORING 
Responses to the perceived similarity questions were coded as 1 if the child 
answered YES to either of the questions and as 0 otherwise. Thus, a child who said YES 
to Q1 received a 1, and was considered to agree to some similarity between the event and 
reality. They were not asked the second similarity question, as it was already implicit in 
their affirmation of the first. However, a child who said NO to Q1, received a 0 but was 
then asked Q2. A child who answered YES to Q2 received a 1, and was treated 
equivalently to a child who received a 1 from Q1, because both children agreed to some 
level of similarity. Conversely, a child who also said NO to Q2 was considered to be 
rejecting any similarity between the novel event and the real world. Responses to Q3 
were coded as 1 if the child answered REAL and a 0 if the child answered NOT REAL. 
Children’s responses were coded for their first and last interview sessions to allow for 
comparison across time. 
SIMILARITY JUDGEMENTS 
Children were asked to assess the similarity between a novel event and the real 
world. The three variations were intended to represent three different levels of similarity. 
It was presumed that riding a two wheeled bike is highly similar to events in the real 
world and is more similar than riding a bike with one wheel, which is moderately 
dissimilar to events in the real world. Moreover, both of these physical events were 
presumed to be more similar than riding a bike with no wheels. Thus, to assess whether 
children’s initial similarity evaluations corresponded to the gradation that was intended, a 
count of total positive similarity responses given on day 1 was conducted for each 
condition. Table 1 reports that all 30 children in the highly similar condition confirmed 
that the event was similar to the real world. Specifically, 29 out of 30 children responded 
positively to Q1 and 1 child responded positively on Q2. Of the children in the 
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moderately dissimilar condition, 25 (out of 30) responded positively to the similarity 
questions, 3 of whom responded positively to Q1. Only 8 (out of 28) children in the 
highly dissimilar condition conferred similarity between the event and reality with only 1 
child responding positively to Q1. Overall, this confirms that children conceptualized the 
similarity of the physical event in accordance with the intended manipulation. 
REALITY JUDGEMENTS 
Given the hypothesis that beliefs about similarity and reality status are associated, 
we would expect that responses to the reality status question would vary in accordance 
with the distribution of similarity judgements reported above. That is, children in the 
highly similar and moderately dissimilar condition would both report high rates of REAL 
judgements followed by children in the highly dissimilar condition. Table 1 reveals that 
26 (out of 30) children in both the highly similar and moderately dissimilar conditions 
answered REAL to the reality status question compared to 18 (out of 28) children in the 
highly dissimilar condition. That is, children in the highly similar and moderately 
dissimilar conditions were equally likely to judge the novel character as real but were 
more likely than children in the highly dissimilar condition to do so. Although this 
pattern is only partially supportive of the prediction that children’s beliefs in the reality of 
the character would decrease as similarity decreases, it nevertheless follows the correct 
direction. 
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN SIMILARITY AND REALITY JUDGEMENTS 
Initial Exposure 
The primary analyses concerned the relationship between each child’s perceived 
similarity responses and reality status judgements over time and across conditions. A 
mixed effect logistic regression was conducted to test the effect of age, time, condition, 
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and their interactions on children’s tendency to associate similarity and reality status 
beliefs. The final model revealed only a significant main effect of time (χ 2(1) = 4.04, p = 
.04) and a significant main effect of condition (χ 2(2) = 11.44, p = .003). This confirmed 
that average rates of associations differed across the three conditions and from day 1 to 
day 5.  
To isolate the association between perceived similarity and reality status beliefs, it 
was necessary to assess differences between the conditions upon initial exposure (i.e., 
responses from day 1). Only the moderately dissimilar and highly dissimilar conditions 
were included in this analysis because children in the highly similar condition were at 
ceiling in their associations. Results from a logistic regression with age, condition, and 
their interaction predicting rates of association on day 1 revealed a non-significant main 
effect of age and a non-significant interaction. Thus, they were excluded from the final 
model in which condition was the only significant predictor (χ 2(1) = 6.55, p < .01). 
Children in the highly dissimilar condition (M = .36, SD = .49) showed significantly 
lower rates of association than children in the moderately dissimilar (M = .70, SD = .47) 
conditions.  
Binomial tests for all three conditions confirmed that rates of association were 
significantly greater than would be expected by chance both the highly similar (p < .001) 
and moderately dissimilar (p < .05) conditions but significantly lower than chance levels 
in the highly dissimilar condition (p > .05). Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of responses 
among children across all conditions. This shows that all children in the highly similar 
condition, who heard a possible, ordinary physical event said that the event was similar to 
the real world and the majority of these children also said that the novel character was 
real. Likewise, the majority of children in the moderately dissimilar agreed that the event 
was similar to the real world and that the character was real. Thus the high rates of 
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association in both the highly similar and moderately dissimilar conditions stem from 
positive, not negative, responses for both perceived similarity and reality status. 
Conversely, most children in the highly dissimilar condition failed to show this high level 
of association. Figure 1 reveals that the most common response children provided was to 
say that the novel character was real but that the event was not similar to the real world 
(36%).  
Repeated Exposure 
The next question of interest was how repeated exposure altered children’s beliefs 
about perceived similarity and reality status judgements. Given the significant main effect 
of time reported by the mixed effect logistic regression (see above), there is some support 
for the hypothesis that repeated exposure did have an effect on the associations. To 
further assess this, a logistic regression of condition, age, and their interaction on 
associations from day 5 was conducted. Again, children from the highly similar condition 
were not included in this statistical test as they were at ceiling in their associations. 
Results revealed a non-significant effect of condition, age, and their interaction. That the 
effect of condition was no longer significant at day 5 supports the hypothesis that 
repeated exposure had an effect on children’s responses. By day 5, rates of association 
were similar across both moderately and highly dissimilar conditions. 
Binomial tests for the three conditions revealed that children in the highly similar 
(M = .87, SD = .35) and moderately dissimilar conditions (M = .73, SD = .45) provided 
significantly more associations than predicted by chance (both ps < .05) and that children 
in the highly dissimilar condition (M=.61, SD=.50) were now showing chance levels of 
associations. Figure 2, in comparison with Figure 1, demonstrates that in both the highly 
similar and moderately dissimilar conditions, children’s responses remained consistent 
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over time (both ps > .05).  Moreover, Figure 2 reveals an increase in the level of 
associations at day 5 among children in the highly dissimilar condition as compared to 
their associations on day 1. Interestingly, the distribution of Real and Not Real responses 
did not change from day 1 to day 5, rather the changes occurred in the distribution of 
similarity judgements. Of the 28 children in this condition, 7 children changed their 
responses on day 5. All 7 exhibited an increase in association rather than a decrease and 
all but 1 of the 7 changed their similarity judgement rather than their reality status 
judgement. Thus, as a result of repeated exposure, nearly half of the children who said 
that Mark was a real character also said that the event was similar (47%) (compared to 
23% on day 1) and the majority of children who said that Mark was a fictional character 
also said that event was dissimilar (89%) (compared to 60% on day 1). This evidence 
suggests that familiarity increases children’s tendency to associate perceived similarity 
and reality.  
Discussion 
 The goal of the present study was to assess developmental differences in the 
relationship between perceived similarity and reality status beliefs, and to explore the 
effects of familiarity on their association. Although no age differences were found, results 
indicated that associations were high for ordinary events and improbable events but not 
for impossible events. Specifically, nearly all children in the highly similar and 
moderately dissimilar conditions reasoned that the event was similar and that Mark was a 
real character. This supports the prediction that children’s beliefs about the similarity 
between a novel event and the real world are associated with and help guide initial beliefs 
about the reality status of the novel world. When faced with a novel world, children are 
able to evaluate its similarity to the real world and use these perceptions to decide 
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whether the novel world is real or fictional. Although one might be inclined to argue that 
children in this study were not making judgements about similarity but were instead 
answering the similarity questions based on their own personal experience with people 
riding two- and one-wheeled bikes, our data suggest that this is not the case insofar as 
many children denied having seen people ride such bikes but still agreed that people 
could do so. This is especially informative in the moderately dissimilar condition. In this 
condition, the majority of children expressed positive judgements of similarity as 
measured by the second similarity question, Q2. In fact, all but 3 children denied that 
things like riding a one-wheeled bike ever happen around them (Q1), instead they said 
that it could happen (Q2). Thus, children were not simply responding based on personal 
experience with people riding one wheeled bikes, rather they seemed to understand, and 
perhaps imagine, that it is at least possible to ride a one wheeled bike. This finding is 
important to highlight because it suggests that children do have some understanding that 
improbable events are possible, arguing against some previous research which suggests 
that children cannot distinguish improbable from impossible events (Shtulman & Carey, 
2007; Woolley & Ghossainy, 2009).  
Results from the highly dissimilar condition revealed that children do not reflect 
exclusively on a novel event’s adherence to physical laws to determine reality status. 
Indeed, many children in the highly dissimilar condition who heard about an impossible 
event responded negatively to the perceived similarity questions but nevertheless asserted 
that Mark was a real character. Such dissimilar-but-real responses suggest that even when 
children admit that an impossible event is dissimilar to the real world, this does not 
necessitate that it be part of a fictional world. Nevertheless, although physical law 
similarity may not be a necessary condition for determining reality, it may still be 
sufficient. Evidence for this is reflected in children’s responses to the highly similar and 
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moderately dissimilar narratives. The majority of these children answered that the events 
were similar and that Mark was a real boy. This evidence is only suggestive, and one 
might argue that physical law similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient on the basis 
that children in all three conditions were more likely to confer reality to Mark rather than 
non-reality.  
Perhaps children believed Mark to be real because of the highly realistic picture 
of the boy that accompanied the story. This would correspond to an evaluation of 
perceptual similarity, a factor that was included in the broader framework of making 
similarity evaluations. Thus, although children in the highly dissimilar condition 
disagreed with the similarity of the physical event to the real world, they may have been 
considering the similarity of Mark to other boys in the real world and therefore concluded 
that he is real. This suggests that in some cases, perceptual similarity may have a stronger 
weight than physical law similarity in the overall similarity evaluation. Although the 
current procedure makes it difficult to assess the isolated effect of physical law similarity 
on reality status beliefs as was the intended purpose of this study, the data nevertheless 
provide preliminary support for the thesis that evaluations of similarity, including 
physical law and perceptual similarity, are associated with beliefs about reality. As 
mentioned earlier, the factors outlined are not presumed to work alone; rather, it is argued 
that they may have additive or interactive effects. To better unpack the relationship 
between physical law and perceptual similarity, a future study might manipulate the 
similarity of the pictorial representation for a set of similar and dissimilar physical events. 
For example, children might hear about a highly dissimilar event and see either a realistic 
representation, a cartoon, or no image at all. It would be predicted that children who were 
shown a cartoon or no image would be less likely to believe the novel character is real 
than children who were shown a realistic picture.  
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The findings support the prediction that repeated exposure affects the rates of 
association between perceived similarity and reality status. On day 1, there was a very 
low level of association among children in the highly dissimilar condition. By day 5, 
however, a subset of children came to show an association, either saying that the event 
was similar and the character was real or the event was dissimilar and the character 
fictional. Thus, repeated exposure seems to have increased children’s tendency to 
associate similarity judgements and reality status beliefs. Unfortunately, it was 
impossible to evaluate the effect of familiarity for the other two conditions because those 
children already had high rates of association on day 1. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that repeated exposure resulted in some children 
expressing that an impossible event is similar to reality. Of the children who responded 
that the event was similar and Mark was real, all but 1 said that riding a bike with no 
wheels does not happen around them but could possibly happen. Thus, children were not 
being suggestible and simply believing that people around them ride bikes with no 
wheels, rather they seemed to become open to the possibility that it could happen. This is 
in line with the Piagetian view of children as learning about the world through the 
assimilation of novel information and accommodation of their own beliefs (Piaget, 1954). 
Although none of the children had ever experienced riding a bike without wheels nor had 
they seen someone ride such a bike, after repeatedly hearing about a child on a bike 
without wheels, they seem to have incorporated this novel information into their schema 
of possible physical events and thus changed their beliefs about how similar this is to the 
real world. This is illustrative of the flexibility of children’s mental models of reality and 
their ability to continuously rework their schemas about how the physical (and potentially 
the social) world behaves. 
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An important follow up of this study would include a larger variety of dissimilar 
events in order to better assess the effects of repeated exposure. It would be important to 
explore the effect of familiarity on children’s judgements of other moderately dissimilar 
events. Although children in this study provided high levels of association for the 
improbable event even on day 1, this might not apply to other improbable events. It is 
conceivable, and not unlikely, that more improbable events would elicit initial 
judgements similar to those seen for the impossible event and that repeated exposure will 
likewise increase children’s tendency to associate similarity and reality. Indeed, our 
results contradict findings reported by Shtulman and Carey (2007) in that children in their 
study were strongly inclined to judge a range of improbable events as impossible. If we 
consider possibility and impossibility as a continuum with improbable events falling 
somewhere in between, it is possible that the events used by Shtulman and Carey (2007) 
fall closer to the end of impossibility than the event used in this study. Thus, a repetition 
of this study with a wider range of improbable events might provide the variability in 
initial judgements about similarity and reality status to confirm that familiarity increases 
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Appendix A: Response Form 
 Highly Similar 
Today I’m going to tell you about a kid named Mark. Mark is five years old and 
he lives with his mom, his dad, and his sister Lucy. Mark loves to go for bike rides in the 
park near his house. He has a bike with two wheels on it, and on Saturday he uses it to go 
for bike rides with his dad. 
 
Moderately Dissimilar 
Today I’m going to tell you about a kid named Mark. Mark is five years old and 
he lives with his mom, his dad, and his sister Lucy. Mark loves to go for bike rides in the 
park near his house. He has a bike with one wheel on it, and on Saturday he uses it to go 
for bike rides with his dad. 
 
Highly Dissimilar 
Today I’m going to tell you about a kid named Mark. Mark is five years old and 
he lives with his mom, his dad, and his sister Lucy. Mark loves to go for bike rides in the 
park near his house. He has a bike with no wheels on it, and on Saturday he uses it to go 
for bike rides with his dad. 
 
Interview Questions - Session 1 
Q1) Tell me, do people around you have a bike with ___________ in real life? 
yes   no 
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Q2) if no to Q1, ask: Do you think people could have a bike with ___________ in 
real life? 
yes   no 
 
Do you think that Mark is 5 years old or 10 years old? 
5   10 
 
Do you think that Mark lives in a big house or a small house? 
big   small 
 
Q3) Do you think Mark is a real boy or is he just a pretend boy? 
real    pretend 
 
Interview Questions Session 2: 
Do you think that Mark wears a blue helmet or a green helmet when he goes on 
bike rides? 
blue   green  
 
Do you think Mark rides his bike everyday or only sometimes? 
everyday   sometimes 
 
Do you think that Mark needs to get a new bike or can he keep his old one? 




Do you think that Mark has a big bike or a small bike? 
big   small 
 
Interview Questions Session 3: 
Do you think that Mark likes to get on the swings in the park or does he like to get 
on the seesaw? 
swing   seesaw 
 
Do you think that Mark rides his bike on the sidewalk or on the street? 
sidewalk  street 
 
Do you think that Mark likes to eat carrots or apples during snack time?  
carrots  apples 
 
Do you think that Mark rides his bike fast or slow? 
fast   slow 
 
Interview Questions Session 4: 
Do you think that Mark rides his bike during the daytime or at night? 
daytime  nighttime 
 
Do you think that Mark has blue eyes or brown eyes? 
blue   brown 
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Do you think that Mark also likes to go swimming in the summer or does he only 
like to ride his bike? 
swimming  biking 
 
Do you think that Mark is a tall boy or is he a short boy? 
tall   short 
 
Interview Questions Session 5: 
Q1) Tell me, do people around you have a bike with ___________ in real life? 
yes   no 
 
Q2) if no to Q1, ask :Do you think people could have a bike with ___________ in 
real life? 
yes   no 
 
Do you think that Mark is 5 years old or 10 years old? 
5   10 
 
Do you think that Mark lives in a big house or a small house? 
big   small 
 
Q3) Do you think Mark is a real boy or is he just a pretend boy? 
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